DISCUSSION OF THE TERM FOLKLORE[*]

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The word Folklore, now in universal use, was used for the first time in a communication addressed to the Athenaeum of London by the English ethnologist William John Thomas, under the pseudonym Ambrose Morton, which was advertised in the issue of the magazine **The Ateneum** corresponding to August 22, 1846; he proposed Folk-lore as a substitute for the expression **Popular Antiques**, widespread after the appearance of Brandt's book, **Popular Antiquities**, mainly devoted to collecting oral traditions, restricting the field of the subject. Thomas argued that the material collected in England, indistinctly under the headings of "popular antiquities" and "popular literature", was rather an expression of popular knowledge and not a literature, nor was it a simple antiquity, "and it could be more properly designated with a good Anglo-Saxon word, **Folk-Lore**, or traditional knowledge of the people", undoubtedly gave great importance to that baptism (if the name does not do the thing, at least it often serves to indicate its essence and facilitate its definition), because he said. "Let it be remembered that I claim the honour of having introduced the appellation of folk-lore, as Disraeli introduced **Father-Land** in the literature of this country""

However, by choosing a term deliberately, to overcome the limitations of the previous ones, Thomas was rendering a greater service to the nascent anthropological discipline, because soon "popular knowledge" took on a broader meaning, according to its etymology and, above all, he delimited its object at the same time by the connotation of "traditional". In short, it is fair to recognize his concern to save data, or details, that were being lost, just as Hene habla tried to do in his work "Every-Day Book', and stimulated the Athenaeum so that, with the help of its curious readers, it would gather an infinity of concrete and interesting data on Customs, ceremonies, beliefs, romances, sayings, superstitions, etc., scattered in the memory of people, small facts and even details that singularly seem trivial and insignificant, but that considered together, as a a system intertwined by analysis and interpretation acquires a value that the ones who collected them would never have dreamed of attributing to them. And as a further coordination, entrusted to a mentality, he set the example of James Grimm, for his contribution to the knowledge of German mythology, despite the defects that the author himself confessed in the second edition of his **Deutsche Mythologie**. Finally, he also suggested the convenience of comparing the traditions of different peoples and complementing those of related peoples.

Thomas's interest was, therefore, very broad, open to all possibilities and understanding as many facts as had tradition as a common denominator, but the first English definitions of folk-lore maintained the sense of the "vulgar antiquities", or "popular" — beliefs and science of the people—, everything that came from common folk, with a content that Henry Bourne inventoried: "old rites and ceremonies to the burdening of the People, innocent customs, pleasures and recreations", and without a doubt many would consider it trivial to deal with "innocent customs", although a few glimpsed, as Andre Lang, the possibilities of a formal and attractive science, a "science that studies the expression, beliefs, institutions, practices, oral literature and arts and hobbies of the mental and spiritual life of the people in general".

Throughout Europe, emphasis was placed on the collection of "folk tales", as one of the main objectives of folklore, following the French tradition that was interested in the literary aspect and was looking for the genuine expression and roots of the so-called "anonymous literature", "traditional literature" and oral literature, in contrast to the work of well-known authors or published, in a certain collectivity.

However, in France the interest of scholars extended to heroic narratives, hagiographic legends, and the beliefs and rites that preside over critical processes of human life in certain localities what cultorology has called "life cycles", —such as ideas about birth, puberty, the union of the sexes, death, the afterlife. Until in 1866 Paul Sevillot fought the excessive restriction to the field of folklore, limited to tales, legends, chants, proverbs, riddles, formulisms, of popular life a whole set that seemed to be condemned in "recreational culture" or had "oral literature" as its core.

However and those limitations to the content of the **folklore**, the French criterion insisted on the value of a very useful element to characterize the future anthropological discipline, namely: the unity or coexistence of the folkloric fact and its indispensable survival in civilized environments. Sevillot understood in the domain of this discipline the study of all the operations of human life that are linked to unofficial beliefs (magic, medicine, conjurations, etc.), popular beliefs and acts related to the physical or animated world, and along that path he came to propose another name, which would be worth as a principle of definition, namely: **Traditional Ethnography**; and later he hinted at the possibility and desirability of separating another series of facts under the heading of "Ethnographic sociology". He was criticized for the invasion of fields outside the **folklore** and the difficulty of drawing defined boundaries between one discipline and another, although he would later worry about delineating the **traditional ethnography** of the **ethnography** properly said and from the **physical anthropology**. The contribution of their ideas and the proposed word, however, oriented towards the conception of folklore as a discipline belonging to anthropology, with all the methodological implications of its success.

German authors adopted the word **Wolkskunde**, by some identified with folk-lore, although others observed that it is difficult to distinguish its meaning from ethnography, proposing to replace it with one more proper: **Volkswissenchaft**. Arthur Ramos, for example, says that "the Germans overextended the scope of their Volkskunde which, in addition to oral traditions, also studies various aspects of the social and material life of the people, such as professions, food, housing, lifestyles, etc. It was a daring incursion into the domains of Ethnology, making it even more difficult to establish the exact respective boundaries, which worried Sevillot so much. Apart from that, parallel to the study of the Wolkskunde, a discipline created by Meringer began to develop in Germany, which, with the name of **Worter und Sachen** (words and Things) invades the field of linguistics and dialectology.

These abusive interpretations end up saturating the domain of the **folklore**, whose boundaries are now about to become dangerously vague. Main. mind when it comes to its limits with Ethnology and its descriptive part, Ethnography."

The following denominations have also been proposed, with less luck: **Demology**, or treatise of the popular, **Demopsychology**, Or psychology of the people; **Demotic**, (Teódulo Biaga), or science of the People; Anthropopsychology, or human psychology; Tradiology (Moya), or science of the traditions of the people Demopedia, (Mariano de Cavia) or "people and instruction"; Demosophy, (Julio Cejador and Frauca), or "Wisdom of the people", as a faithful translation of the term folklore, As the most controversial point outside the inclusion in folk-lore of the study of objects and facts of the so-called **material culture**, in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries great interest was aroused by the formation of folk museums, pretending to form them with absolute autonomy from anthropological museums. He also came to conceive a **Folk-lore Ergológico** (de Ergon, work), lending a rather inappropriate term to Montandon, who used it to designate what Ethnology has traditionally considered as "material culture"; (George Montandón "Traite d'ethnologie Culturelle"), applied the term **ergology** to the facts of material culture: and **animology**, to those of spiritual culture; but such unnecessary neologisms can only add to the confusion. By understanding, along with housing, furniture, clothing and ornaments, weapons and industry, other economic facts, such as trade, means of transport and so on, the field of study is joined with those of ethnology and human geography.

The word folklore has definitely been imposed, but the efforts to find a name, which synthesizes the definition, have not been completely useless, because they have shown that folklore research is closely linked to social anthropology, since it seeks the idiosyncrasies of a people, considering the origins, evolution and fixation of natural reactions, which end up becoming characteristic cultural features. Those who have rightly wanted to elevate this study to the category of a scientific discipline, attribute to it as an object "the prehistory of peoples".

Van Gennep has tried to settle that first discussion, stating that "it is necessary to consider the word folk-lore in the same utilitarian way applied to many other scientific terms, when they have the advantage of being international"; A. Martinus **Le Neo-folklorisme**, Louvain, 1931), goes further: "It should not bother us to find out where folk-lore begins and where it ends. It would be a waste of time, if we don't know what characterizes him."

II

PRECURSORS OF FOLKLORE

Various precursors of folklore and indirect contributors to the constitution of such a discipline have been mentioned — in a plurality of opinions —, whom the Count of Puymaigre called "unconscious folklorists""; but if many have bequeathed observations and documentary testimonies, spreading myths, legends, customs and oral traditions of all kinds, that same evidences the extension of the field that folklore science covers and the need for its study.

Mention should be made of the Rhapsods, such as Hesiod and Homer; historians such as Herodotus and Plutarch; travelers such as Ctesias and Pausanias, grammarians such as Aulus Gellius, geographers such as Strabo, naturalists such as Pliny, scholars such as Apulchre, critics such as Petronius and Lucian of Samosata; but this enumeration could be enlarged, with many others who collected isolated data and even left complete descriptions of the customs, habits, beliefs, arts and traditional narratives of the peoples of the seniority. (Joao Ribeiro distinguishes among the precursors to Plutarch, by his **Roman Issues**, Fontanelle, 1694, for his essay on the origin of fables; Vico, for having typified Ethnography in its principles of **The New Science**, T. Brown, 1646, for his **Enquiries into vulgar and common errors**, Jean Nicolas Demeunier, for his book **Religions, Moeurs et legends**). Several authors, however, consider that folklore begins with mythography, whose first system appears 300 years before Christ with the Greek philosopher Evemero or Euhemero; his work is only known fragmentarily translated by Ennius- but it reached great diffusion, interprets myths as historical facts and explains them largely as deification of heroes.

Among that class of precursors — unconscious folkforists — Guatemala can classify the first chroniclers and historians of the colony, numerous travelers and, later, costumbrists and cultivators of narrative literature. Thanks to them, the oral tradition was collected and customs, beliefs, rites, techniques and elements of material culture were described.

This "traditionalist" concern, interested in collecting oral literature and other values of popular antiquities, is accused in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century and already in the first third of the eighteenth offers such important achievements as the French edition of **The Romance of the Rose**, by Jean Fred. Bernard, appeared in Amsterdam in 1735.

The entire nineteenth century is marked by spontaneous efforts, the whole of which was asking for analysis, as a preliminary step to the subsequent systematization, because curiosity, love of tradition, regionalist pride, the teaching intention that invades the literature of the previous century, and other elements alien to the scientific concept of folklore operate. The Brothers Grimm are mentioned for their **Kinder und Hausmárchen**, **1813**; the publication in Bordeaux of **Usages et Chansons de Vancien Bazadais**, by Lamarque de Plaisance, 1845, which can already be considered as the more or less perfect type of the folkloric collection; the **Letters from Walkensar**, whose author used the pseudonym, for fear of being looked upon as devoting his wits to frivolous Things, Thomas's exposition, 1846; **Le Foyer Breton**, by Emile Souvestre, in whose prologue it is already said that "history is the official life of humanity, in which public acts are recorded, folklore is the private life, in which memory of private acts, of intimacies and their reflection in public acts is kept" anticipating the concept of folklore as the prehistory of peoples, the first dissemination of the **Panchatantra** in Latin, 1848, and of its imitation which circulated in 1855 under the title of Hitopadesa; the **Etudes sur la poesie populaire en Normandie**, by Beaurepaire, 1856; **Les notes de campagne en Berry**, by Rivault de Lagardiere, 1857; Contos provencais, by Ribaud, 1862; **Campaign Romance**, by Tarbé, 1863; the works of Champfleury and of Weckerlin, 1865; the English edition of the **Panchatantra**, by Kielhorn and Búhler, 1868.

When he died, in 1870, Laimel de la Salle left two unpublished manuscripts, one on "**Uses and customs of Berry**"and another about **Beliefs and legends**, products of his personal collection, with notes on the origins and enunciation of analogies, so that his approach and his way of treating the matter are an important milestone for the science baptized in 1846 by Thomas.

When de la Salle's work was published a few years later, with a foreword by George Sand, it observed that "the more it immerses itself in the past, the more fiction takes the place of history, and seeks the kinship of the different versions of the legends, establishing certain links with the most ancient cults of the universe".

In 1919, Jean Variot would come to corroborate and expand on George Sand's criterion, stating that "Folklore has its sources in the remote mysteries of the origins of human thought, in historical facts and trivial incidents of ordinary life; that legend is the daughter of history; that it is difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly where folklore themes come from; that no country or region can be considered the exclusive owner of a certain folklore fact; that the popular imagination is renewed much less than it is believed; finally, that it is the style of each manifestation that gives the folkloric event its local color".

III

REASON FOR THE STUDY

Each people has characteristic traditions, that is, they define their idiosyncrasies, they carry and reveal elements deeply incorporated into their life, so that the knowledge of national traditions illuminates their psychology and allows us to know the internal springs that move their interest, and, on the other hand, the people who know and cultivate their traditions have more faith in themselves or better orientation to follow spontaneously the processes of their own evolution, in short, it has been said that from the knowledge of national traditions the love of the homeland is born or nourished, and that their comparison with the traditions of other peoples it can create bonds of sympathy and foster understanding and love for humanity.

It has been said that "in song, dance, rites, legends, superstitions, customs, etc., the concerns of past generations are expressed, as well as their customs, techniques, proverbs and sentences, riddles, etc., collect their experiences and the motivations of their actions, in such a way that the whole represents a traditional treasure, of which much is lost and that it is necessary to preserve, not only out of simple curiosity, but to guide us in understanding the psychology of our people.

Sometimes, it is even necessary to systematically study the manifestations of the popular flavor, in order to seek the evolution of it or to find the internal springs that could motivate fruitful transculturations and steps of beneficial progress to the community. It is no less useful to encourage and stimulate such manifestations, to give the people self-confidence, to stimulate their creative fantasy and their capacity for work, and to lend to their future works the foundation of tradition."

It is also warned that "in an era of multiple and easy contacts with other peoples, it is appropriate to preserve authentic and constructive national values, to save the natural artistic dispositions of the people, to encourage their creative instinct, in the certainty that this way facilitates, at the same time, a greater understanding, sympathetic sensitivity, towards human values, because in popular knowledge there is much of the substance of man and, outside of his particular characteristics — or rather within them —, there are essential values".

It should be noted, finally, that in children's games — being the imitator par excellence - lifestyles are copied, seemingly trivial scenes that reach deep meaning for the community, traces of the experience and ways of thinking and feeling of the people; hence UNESCO has recognized "the need to use folklore resources in schools, to give children an atmosphere of their own" and — it could be added — to facilitate and make their education more pleasant.

Apart from these and other practical considerations, it is enough to recognize that folklore is "an aspect of the cultural history of man"; and that in order to understand it, it is necessary to analyze culture, to the point that the explanation of the folklore phenomenon ultimately depends on the explanation given to cultural phenomena in general; in other words, ontologically folklore has to be accepted as a source of culture and its study cannot be omitted, nor could that of any other of the anthropological and cultural sciences be neglected, among which it must necessarily be included.

IV

CONCEPT OF FOLKLORE

From the collection of fairy tales and folk tales, folklore -extending his goals he went on to look for another field of study in the **fabla popular**, because both the vulgar current and the erudite current contribute to the formation of the language, and it is known that thought and speech are so closely linked, that from the simple fact of speaking a certain language the possession of certain inherited ideas is derived, or in other words, the language contains a lot of the cultural values to which it serves as a means of expression; in short, speech is a source to investigate to know the origin and establish the extension and persistence of certain proverbial expressions, untranslatable locutions to other languages and spontaneous manifestations of popular ingenuity: riddles, sayings , sentences, jokes, etc., the idiomatic element is no less interesting in the study of artistic forms: couplets, songs, epic stories, or formulas of popular mentality and experience: omens, superstitions, beliefs, etc. The linguistic element will work together to analyze and determine the national, regional or local characteristics.

Sevillot's conceptions still extended the field of folklore in the middle of the last century; but following the initial criterion of **popular antiques**, the folklorist conformed with the collection of couplets, sayings, superstitions, tales, legends and traditions, plus the description of inveterate uses and customs; by which Leon Pineau could conclude: "It is the set of traditions of a people that constitutes that which we call folklore'" (Revue Moderne, 1896). But the term of **traditions** it is broad and vague, all culture is tradition, and it allowed for differences with respect to the object of folkloric science: some limited their study to "the spiritual culture of the people", as Ch. S. Bourne (**Hand-book of Folk-lore**; London, 1914) and Kaarle Krohn (**Die Folkloristische Arbeits Methode** Oslo 1926); while others also concluded "material culture", in particular traditional folk techniques, such as Joaquín Ribeiro (**Brazilian Folklore**, Rio de Janeiro, 1944), for whom "technique and knowledge depend on each other in everyday life, and are still spliced".

Soon there were also opinions contrary to the tendency to reduce the study of folklore to the orderly exposition of cultural values of authentic popular extraction, because it is estimated that all these data must be subjected to an interpretation —psychological or sociological — and it is still possible to take them to the philosophical field, to verify whether the "**let's give"** it responds to its historical destiny.

The Colombian teacher Aristóbulo Pardo believes that the two tendencies coexist and complement each other (it can even be added that they necessarily seem one after the other), and distinguishes them by conventional names: **folklorists** those who systematize the research, collect the materials and expose them in order; **folklorologists**, who investigate the origin, evolution and variations of the folkloric fact, compare it with identical or similar manifestations of other peoples, establish their relationship and suggest possible generalizations.

It has also been necessary, to the extent that folklore has invaded fields previously reserved for ethnography, to seek the distinction between the **ethnographic fact** and the **folkloric fact**. The term **ethnography** it was adopted by Campe —1807— to characterize a branch of studies that deals with "the description of peoples" the neologism expanded, due to the need to use its own terminology, although different limits were given to its object and methodological discrepancies were accused, successively, linguistic and racial theories tried to imprint their stamp on it; for Wiseman, for example, ethnography was "the classification of races by the comparative study of language", and Max Müller still suffered that influence, although he combined the linguistic tendency with the symbolic interpretation. The racial concept, on the other hand, predominates in the works of the Anglo-Saxons (Lubbaock, Logan, Brace in England), and when the United States of America was founded the **American Ethnological Society**, in 1848, set out to investigate "the origin, evolution and characteristics of the different human races".

The term **ethnology** had arisen in Paris, 1839, on the foundation of the **Societé d'ethnologie**, to study "the physical organization, the intellectual and moral characters, the languages and the historical traditions, peculiar to the races and which distinguish them from one another". Then the problem arose of delineating his field from that of another discipline as similar as the **ethnography**. James Hunt, 1865, —following Latham's ideas justified the existence of two sciences: the **ethnology**, speculative and general, and the **ethnography**, descriptive and particularized; etymological criterion accepted by Littré. "The **ethnology** deals with the origin and distribution of peoples, and the **ethnography** from his description.'"Paul Topinard, on the other hand, admitted only one science, divided into two branches: a general, or **ethnology** properly speaking, and another particular, or ethnography.

We have made this digression because Sevillot wanted to make folklore a **traditional ethnography**, although he took care to differentiate this discipline from ethnography proper; because others have conceived folklore as a third branch of ethnology; and because J. Deniker (**Les races et les peuples de la terre**) by including it among the anthropological sciences, he believed it essential to differentiate the **folklore** of the **ethnography**, by the following criterion" "the **ethnography** studies the material and intellectual culture of primitive societies; the **folklore** the material and intellectual culture of the popular classes of the civilized countries"'; Hoyos Sainz wanted to explain that distinction: "**the ethnographic fact.**" By its source and destination, tends to the museum, while the **folkloric fact** it tends to the bibliography; and, even when it covers the object of folklore, material culture, it does so from another point of view, the sub-historical, that is, popular and traditional."

But even the popular and traditional elements have been conditioned to other concurrent circumstances to characterize the **folkloric fact**; for example, Rafael Corzo ("**The new conception of folklore**"; Boletin de la Asociación Tucumana de Folklore; Tucumán, número 9-10, January-February 1951) believes himself obliged to reason out a provisional definition: "folklore is a discipline organized for the study of tradition, in the past and in the present, in all its aspects and characters, in the forms it takes and the functions it performs in relation to the needs, the feelings and the aspirations of the people a of the peoples. In this regard, it can be said that the question that reduced it to traditional manifestations of the vulgar or the plebs has been overcome, since the folklorists agree that the task of their research is tradition, where it shows itself or presents itself, in the humble and in the upper classes, in the villages and in the cities." Equal or greater caution may be seen in the **Institute of Tradition of Buenos Aires** -when giving instructions to the Argentine researchers, in 1951-, namely; "Nor do the facts and objects that constitute folklore, or folkloric reality, allow themselves to be reduced to universally valid cardinal concepts, appearing rather as a cultural formation of very varied content, current in social media of fluid limits; with different and uncertain historical depths and that, in current times, usually presents itself in virtual or full disintegration, as a set of remains, often disjointed".

The Swiss folklorist Hoffman-Kibayer (quoted by Van Genn notes that folklore is characterized "by being in circulation or being disseminated or used by the people, consciously or unconsciously; the essential thing is that it lives among the people or is used by them. In a way, it can have an erudite origin and subsist in the popular environment by accommodating itself to the spirit of said environment, which accepts, adopts or uses it"; and Luis Da Cámara Cascudo (Apparently given to the **I Brazilian Congress of Folklore**; Natal, June 29, 1951) is impressed by such complexity: "Folklore is the science of the collective, but the collective does not determine creation; individual act that is transformed expanded, adopted incessantly through use and popular memory, taking forms, dividing into variants, obeying local psychological and natural demands. Research in oral and traditional literature (the novelistic, for example) shows the erudite root of a large percentage. The people is not creative; it is enlarging, conservative by the process of additions and substitutions, in accordance with the environmental mentality. Thus, the religious phenomenon studied in its history, especially in the liturgy, shows the antiquity and sometimes universality of what we believed to be regional. Differentiation, which is the index of the anonymous and persistent collaboration of the people, gives the localist, regional, national, religious or customary character. There are mysteries of reminiscence that cannot be confused with survival. Where we hope to find a rich and positive material we find the total absence of what we considered safe", and after some impressive examples, he concludes: "the conservation and elimination processes are kept secret".

As a doctrinal orientation, it is interesting the suggestion presented to the **I Brazilian Congress of Folklore** for the **Commission Paulista of Folklore**, namely: "Folkloric facts are the ways of thinking, feeling and acting of a people, preserved by oral tradition and by limitation, and less influenced by the circles and institutions that are dedicated to the renewal and conservation of human scientific and artistic heritage, such as intellectuals; or to the fixation of a religious or philosophical orientation, such as churches and sectarian institutions in general".

"We understand the relative uniformity in the folkloric facts, structure or form that they present (stories, songs, dances, oral literature, cars), as the natural modifications that denote the regional psychological aspect. These modifications, more or less, will give the local index and by them it is possible to identify it in some cases.

The same for the ethnographic end, or material element, working individually, on the utilitarian plane."

"The **seniority**, or **anonymity**, the **disclosure**, the **oral transmission** of the technique (ethnographic) or of the usage or the custom (also the oral literature) fix the distinctive elements. By **Seniority** let us also understand the **persistence**; for the **anonymity** the folk collective action) differentiating, the **disclosure** justifies the presence in regions or larger areas of influence, folklore being interested in what is alive or in use; the **orality** it is the typical form or indispensable teaching of the **vitality**, reflecting the sympathy of a people for its own knowledge (lore)."

FOLKLORE AS SCIENCE

We consider folklore as a science, classifying it among the anthropological sciences and, more especially, within the cultural and historical concepts; therefore, the two problems related to its **object**: the nature of the phenomena it studies and the field that comprises them; that is, we have to distinguish and limit it as a separate science, and establish its relations with the sciences that are related to it and reciprocally auxiliary.

The difficulties in defining folklore and systematizing it as a scientific discipline arise primarily from the complexity of its object; from the plurality and confusion of the terminology adopted; and the mobility of the basic concepts — theories, doctrines and even individual appreciations — that do not allow to immediately achieve the order and synthesis characteristic of abstract and physical sciences. There have also been obstacles: the persistence of a certain empiricism - there are plenty of folklore amateurs - to continue collecting and interpreting the data; and the disagreement of the folklorologists themselves regarding the definition of the object of their study. Finally, although scientific methods can be followed and systematic generalization is aspired to, folklore phenomena always have a certain national — and even regional or local — character, so that the methods and criteria show geographical differences, so it is possible to talk about European or American folklore and, within these, French or Guatemalan folklore, and that regionalist connotation evidences the basic indeterminacy of the object of our subject, making it difficult to subject to strict scientific methods and the enunciation of general principles.

These are the same problems that sociology had to face in order to establish itself as a science, and folklore being also a social science, we can take advantage of that discussion and adopt conclusions that are generally accepted: a) social problems admit scientific analysis, the same as natural problems, b) the existing social fact, objectively, outside of individual consciousnesses; c) the social fact is coercive, with an indirect, but effective empire, which forces us to live social conventions, d) the social fact always plays a motivated function, although sometimes we do not manage to specify the cause efficient that lends it validity; e) social facts are interdependent with each other, within a dynamic complex. In sum, the social fact transcends individual behavior and motivations, is transmitted by social inheritance and is always perfectible; and these postulates govern in the historical-cultural field; hence the folkloric fact, as a socio-cultural fact, is objective or external to our consciousness, coercive, collective, interdependent and perfectible; and is therefore susceptible of systematic research, methodical exposition and scientific generalization.

It would remain to differentiate the folkloric fact, of a sociocultural nature, from the social fact itself, studied by sociology. According to Paulo de Carvalho Neto (**Folklore Concept**. Editorial "Livraria Monteiro Lobato"; Montevideo, 1955), there is a first angular difference, depending on the point of view and the purpose; because "anthropology wonders what significance (the fact) has for man in himself and for man considered in his relations with man; while Sociology investigates the significance that he has for society as a unit". In addition, some of the characteristics of the folkloric event – if not all – are valid as differential features, namely: antiquity, survival, anonymity, non-institutionalized transmission, populism or vulgarity and traditional dynamism.

The folkloric fact occurs in the community, as a social heritage, of anonymous origin, spontaneously transmitted by tradition, with implicit modifications in the dynamics of social life; it is a collective heritage that determines ways of being, thoughts, feelings and lifestyles; they may have been lost in the course of the years and their original motivations, but retains a functional intention and anyway fulfills a role in the environment in which it is produced or adopted. According to Carvalho Neto, at least three of its elements must come together to characterize the folkloric fact; this observation is useful, because the possibility of observing it in a "nascent state" has been discussed, independently of its traditional characteristic, and there are those who argue that the folkloric fact can be not only retrospective, but also prospective, if the characteristics of collective, anonymous and essentially popular fact are observed in it.

Also, with regard to popular music and literature, it has been answered that the condition of **anonymism** it is essential to recognize that the people adopt many times and only expand and modify, and it would be an equivalent of that characteristic widespread use by sympathetic adoption. It is necessary to take these observations into account, but we should not rush to support them, because caution will never be superfluous to avoid confusion or mixtification, even if one wants to incidentally contrast the value vitality to that of anonymity, relatively conditioned by the **seniority** in the case of a collective fact, it is very likely that for the vast majority of those who use the folkloric fact, its origin is unknown or has been forgotten, and only a small group knows it, or perhaps only the scrupulous researcher, as happens with songs that everyone sings, pieces that everyone hums, even to accompany themselves with some rhythm in their work, whose author is known by the scholar, but never by the common people. As for the observation of folklore in its nascent state, or the admission of a prospective fact, there is a risk of being confused with fashion, which is transitory, and not only its condition of "traditional" and of **seniority**, but would cease to be esteemed the **extensive** dissemination that must have its validity or prestige within the community. Finally, there would be no element of judgment to ensure its persistence or survival. Still less acceptable seems a theoretical limitation to the essential condition of **popularity**, in the face of the possible erudite origin of a fact adopted by the vulgar, or the persistence or validity of folkloric facts in the upper classes, despite their education. By the way, the quote by Cervantes transcribed by Ismael Moya is very interesting (**Didactics of Folklore**, Editorial Ateneo; Buenos Aires, 1948): "And do not think, sir, that I call vulgar only plebeian and humble people, that anyone who does not know, even if he is Lord and Prince, can and should enter the number of vulgar". In conclusion, it is not advisable to abuse exceptions against the general criterion, let alone leave them to the whim of some researcher interested in collecting as many folkloric facts as possible.

It is more difficult to limit the object of folklore as an anthropological science. It is classified among cultural anthropology, which includes: Paleo-ethnology, Ethnology, Ethnography, Linguistics and Folklore.

THEORIES, DOCTRINES AND SCHOOLS

Because the concept and method of our discipline have necessarily been subordinated to the ethnographic theories and tendencies of folklore researchers and expositors, we must review the successively dominant doctrines, although their chronology is not so rigorous, because before folklore was constituted as a scientific discipline and the systematization of the so-called classical theories, the precursors advanced ideas that could be assimilated to one or another of these doctrines.

The Precursors. -Pausanias is distinguished among the ancient Greeks, according to Van Gennep's criterion, by his work "Description of Greece" which - for the author quoted - "is a true folkloric survey". Joao Ribeiro attributes the primacy to Plutarch, for his "Roman questions", stating that Pausanias only offers a documentation, while the author of the **Parallel Lives** try to give an explanation by exegetical comments.

Joaquín Ribeiro believes that the chronicles, letters, diaries of travelers and writings of missionaries in the Middle Ages, only sporadically offer valuable data and in general such works cannot be seen as a precursor of folklore, because they are too biased, with a **parti-pris** religious, and other prejudices detract from their objectivity.

For the English folklorist Andrew Lang, Fontenelle's essay on the origin of fables, 1694, is of great importance and he considers it a precursor of the anthropological school; but before him Thomas Brawn author of **Enquiries into vulgar and common errors**, 1646, Brosses, 1760, added to the information, quite objective, interpretative attempts; he was the introducer of the word fetish to characterize false divinities. We have collected more extensive data on precursors before.

Classical Theories. - Following the criterion of Joaquín Ribeiro, from whose exhibition (**Folklore Brasileiro, Livraria editoria** Zelio Valverde, Rio de Janeiro, 1994) we offer here a synthesis, five tendencies or doctrines can be understood successively, namely: I-Evemerism, II-Symbolist interpretation, III-Linguistic theory; IV-Anthropological doctrines: a) racial interpretation; b) Anthropological School; c) Theory of elementary ideas; d) theory of uniform evolution; V–Cultural historical movement. These theories appear applied to anthropological studies and in particular to ethnography, but they exerted a decisive influence on the interpretation of culture and on the evaluation of folklore.

Euhemerism. —The "sacred History" of Evemero or Ehumero IV century BC- is considered as the first source of mythography, and influences the first ideas about folkloric facts, although they have not been identified as such. The author supposes that on an imaginary island, called Panchaia, the inscriptions of a temple revealed the origin of the gods and cults, allowing him to reconstruct the history of the Greek divinities, and offered as proof the mounds of the Gods visible in certain regions of Hellas; the Gods appeared to his eyes as deified heroes, men who had imposed themselves out of admiration or fear, until they were regarded in posterity as supernatural beings; another argument was the popular belief in magical powers and the tradition of men who had astonished their contemporaries with portentous deeds, superior to human capacity or power.

The fathers of the Christian church found this doctrine useful to combat paganism (Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius St. Augustine) and then theologians repeated that "while the pagan Gods were divinized men, Jesus was, on the contrary, humanized God"' and there were those -Samuel Bochart, seventeenth century- maintained that many of the Greek divinities were mixtifications of biblical characters (Saturn admitted the parallel with Noah); in the following century, Father Antonio Banier, in his work **Mythology and fables explained by history**, systematized the Evemerist doctrine and had followers. However, the theory did not resist the clarifications of comparative mythology, as the need to resort to the study of the mythology of other peoples became evident, but, although in its general structure the theory of Evemero did not resist criticism, it is not entirely absurd and maintained its influence even in the nineteenth century (Spencer partially accepts it) and even today there are those who consider it auxiliary, taken in its proper terms, to explain certain facts; it would suffice to mention in America the legend of **Quetzalcoatl** (**Kukulkan** between the Mayans and **Gukumatz** among the Kichés) Zamná and other deified heroes; a very general trend in primitive peoples and which made Spencer think that religion is derived mainly from the cult of the dead.

Symbolist Theory. - The allegorical trend also begins in Greece, which gives a symbolic interpretation to myths and legends; for Teajen, the struggle of the gods alludes to that of the elements; the trend was favored by occultism (orphism, mysteries, Eleusis) and was followed by the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria (Plotinus, Porphyry, Porcius and Julian spoke of "an ancient knowledge") that explained the gods within a useful symbology.

In the Moderna age Bryant, 1774, identifies symbols of Noah's Ark in various myths, Thomas Taylor, 1974, explains Greek legends of Pausanias as mythical allegories, and Frederick Kreuser, 1810-12, systematizes the theory in his "**The Symbolism and Mythology of the Ancients peoples and particularly of the Greeks**". He gained followers and some of them concretized the tendency to celestial phenomena -astral theory-: it is interesting, for what has folkloric collection, the extensive work of Angelo de Gubernatis on the solar myth.

The symbolist explanation found flattering in America. Su le has criticized that the symbolic meaning attributed to myths varies in space and time and still depends, precariously, on personal interpretation, admitting plural explanations; it was finally displaced by philological trends.

Linguistic Doctrines. - F. Bopp applied the comparative method to the study of languages, the vehicle of tradition, determining relationships between the great Indo-European family; systematic observation in that field influenced ethnography, to which Wyseman gave as a basis "the comparative study of languages"; also folklore, or the "study of folk traditions" received the same influence, due to the importance of language in the spiritual manifestations of Peoples, and comparative mythology reached great boom. Max Múller was one of the systematizers of the linguistic doctrine, with extensive studies on the origins and migration of legends, myths and tales, going beyond the Aryan field to go back to the Sanskrit language; however, he still maintained the use of Kreuser's symbolism,

Racial Theories. - From the very beginning, the anthropological school exaggerated the importance of race value, which came to replace that of language and, as a corollary, folklore facts were considered as spiritual characteristics of the various races. The notion of people (ethnicity) was confused. and of race, but this simple factor of physical anthropology does not explain the unity of the human spirit, revealed through surprising coincidences.

Theories of Elementary Ideas. - Advocated by Adolfo Bastián, within the anthropological doctrine, he lent to ethnography his first suprematic conception (Michael Haberlandt); he proposed a homogeneity of the physical and spiritual nature of the human being, capable of reaching identical results, with the same elements in certain circumstances, according to their degree of evolution; the Argentine Roberto Lehmann Nitsche exemplifies with popular astronomy.

The theory has value, if the generalization is not exaggerated, despite arguments and evidence, opposed by the theory of the "transmission of culture" defended by Ratzel and his Coryphaeans. The French school of Levy-Bruhl reached similar conclusions regarding primitive peoples; this explains mythological coincidences between peoples who seem to have had no connection whatsoever; however, this tendency did not completely close the way to historical transmission or tradition.

Theory of Uniform Evolution.- Within the anthropological doctrine, the English school (Taylor, Andrew Lang, Edward Clodd) took as a basis the principle of uniform evolution, under the influence of the indefinite progress of the evolutionist doctrine, and reflected on folklore to consider that the folkloric facts are vestiges of previous evolutionary phases and their antiquity is directly due to their rudeness or barbarity; the analogies of one people to another are explained by the fact that both have passed through the same phase, without the need to establish a genealogy. But evolution is not always harmonious and involution is also conceived: a technical progress, for example, can coincide with a moral setback; generalization was crossed out inaccuracies: monotheism, for example, is not necessarily preceded by polytheism, but a general fact of the human mentality. The influence of the naturalist concept to distort the reality of the social historical world was also criticized, although some folklorists, such as Joao Ribeiro, considered folklore as a science "that participates at the same time of the historical sciences and the natural sciences", estimating that the folklorist, in terms of method, "must possess the qualities of the historian and those of the naturalist".

Historical-Cultural Movement. - Five schools can be separated:

I. Ratzel's anthropogeographic work, with the Ethnological Museum of Berlin as its driving force, was the initial basis of the renewal movement.
II. Classical School of the Cultural Cycle, centered in the Cologne Museum and its leadership in Vienna, under the ideas of Wilhelm Schmidt.
III. American school, chaired by Boas, which instead of cultural cycles conceives areas of transculturation (acculturation).
IV. School of Nordenskiold and his disciple Alfred Metraux, cultural historical criteriology.
V. Cultural ologenesis, centered at the School of Anthropology of Paris, guided by George Montandon.

In general, it returns to the philosophical roots, being able to reflect both materialism and idealism, culminating the system with the work of Montandon ("**Traite d'ethnologie culturelle**"), who named his doctrine **cultural ologenesis** in front of the **human ologenesis** supported by Daniel Rosa in his **General biology**.

Montandon drew on the most important modern contributions within the historical-cultural movement: Schmidt, Graebner, Foy, Ankermann, Koppers and others, taking advantage of the fundamental criticisms that were made to them and trying to reconcile the discrepancies within a unitary philosophical criterion.Moderna. Here is the synthesis that he himself presented as guidelines for the new school:

a.   The development of civilization starts from a primordial, universal study of culture, produced by equivalent elements anywhere.

b.   The second stage is produced by the emergence of general, regional, local cultural cycles, etc. A cultural cycle is to cultural ethnology what a race is to somatic ethnology. (Physical Anthropology).

c.   The boundary between the two stages is not absolute; cultural complexes tend to form from the beginning and, at all times, certain elements are a spontaneous product that is formed independently of cultural cycles.

d.   The formative processes of a cultural cycle usually — not in an absolute thesis - take place in a certain area and not radiating from some center.

e.   It is convenient to distinguish the occasionally invented cultural elements from the traditionally adopted elements, the latter constitute the majority or are the only characteristics of a cycle.

f.   It cannot be known whether analogous cultures of large regions on different continents derive from a common source for the whole world, or offer a phenomenon of convergence.

g.   Some cultures have elements more susceptible to development than others, the set of cultures after the universal stage can be divided into a **early cultural branch** of limited development, and a **late cultural branch** of unlimited development.

Joaquín Ribeiro comments that, thanks to Montandon's effort of synthesis, fixing these postulates of cultural eulogénesis, safe and defined, ethnological science has bases appropriate to its range of science.

METHOD AND TECHNIQUE

The affirmation that folklore is a discipline included among the anthropological and cultural sciences, already indicates that in the examination, analysis and exposition of folklore facts, historical and cultural methods should preferably be used, although special techniques are used at the same time — method and technique should not be confused—, based on the experiences of researchers and their theoretical purification, so that field and cabinet work are coordinated, without empiricism or dialectics prevailing. Malinowski has timely drawn attention to differences between theory and practice that need to be taken into account.

All folklore research, therefore, should be done within scientific molds, obeying the methodological norms commonly followed in the social sciences, although we have previously collected the criterion of Joao Riveiro, who believes that both these methods and those of the natural sciences are indispensable. The truth is that all methodologies have caused crises, because of the doubts opposed to the fundamental laws or the effectiveness of their application in view of the results obtained; but in the physical or natural sciences these crises have not been as serious or persistent as in the field of social sciences, to the extent that some suppose that they have contributed to a greater degree, or more significantly, to the well—being of humanity — the ultimate goal of science - by allowing man to control nature and its exploitation through efficient techniques, while the results of the social sciences are vague and of questionable pragmatism.

Naturalists believe that only the methods of the natural sciences satisfy the demands of serious scientific research and lead to exact and general laws, valid in all time and space; laws that, in addition, are easily ordered within a hierarchical system and even though it is sometimes difficult to unify them, it is always possible to draw links and correspondences to maintain the congruence of the system, in short, their mathematical expression makes them more precise.

If we compare them with the social sciences, they seem to have not reached their goal - although it cannot be said that they have taken the wrong path — partly because their object is more complex, even if some responsibility is attributed to their methodology, which can be considered in a period of development already surpassed by the natural sciences. If their laws cannot be perfectly hierarchized, it is perhaps due to the noticeable distrust of anthropologists towards abstraction, inclining to give precedence to the quantitative over the qualitative and operating, consequently, with data whose introspective control could distort, it is still worth drawing attention to the ambiguity of many essential terms to these sciences, giving rise to controversies about their strict meaning or to confusions derived from their different use or interpretation.

Hence, it has been proposed, to overcome such difficulties, a whole reconstruction of the social sciences according to the model of the natural ones, an arduous undertaking — without prejudging on its effectiveness — if it is noticed that the experimental method would not admit such a wide application as in physics, nor would statistical surveys provide a substitute, because such a procedure concentrates us on the mathematical relationships of phenomena and only in a small margin do the social sciences succeed in operating through mental activity and disposition, in the face of observable, measurable facts.

Others argue that the methods of the natural sciences are not applicable to the social ones, whose complicated phenomena admit their reduction to strict laws, always sui generis, even superior to the physical ones, if you will, because of the circumstance of being affirmed in sources intimately linked to the scientist himself by the procedures of introspection and understanding, constitutive of a specific methodology, Those who deny the possibility of strict laws to the social sciences, settle less on the adoption of the methods of the natural sciences; here are their arguments: the laws of the social sciences are fluid, conditioned by given historical circumstances; however, , vary with the "perspective" of the scientist - according to the time that separates him from the phenomenon—, with his personal equation, and with the ever—changing social scene, human freedom —will— and an interrelation complex introduce indeterminacy factors into the social prognosis. On the other hand, experimentation is only possible on a small scale, as we said before, and a method appropriate to the social sciences, whose conclusions lack objective validity and adjusted mathematical expression, could not rest on it.

A third position would remain: there is no single method and each of the social sciences would require a separate methodology, if its particular research technique reaches propositions that can be encompassed by given general norms. Just as a judge must apply the law to particular cases, adapting the facts to the general assumption and issuing a ruling, in the same way the scientist has to admit or reject certain propositions according to given rules, based on the rules formulated by his discipline, and make a decision – never arbitrary — that consists of incorporating this or that proposition into his science, without changing the corpus of said science, unless he has what in methodology is called sufficient reason to take the responsibility of suggesting a change; however, there are no rules of procedure that represent an absolute limitation and oblige the forced acceptance of some rule, but in any case the disparities between that rule and the result of observation or the logical interpretation of the phenomenon should be noted and if possible discussed.

If logic is considered as a normative science, this concept will guide us to understand the character of the rules of scientific procedure, because if it does not teach what man really thinks, it is a guide to suppose what he should think, that is, it gives norms or rules (we understand by norm a maximum guideline of our powers, and by rule the regular and effective way of doing a thing correctly): so that to decide and express scientifically is conceived only according to the norms and rules of logic. Let's not forget, of course, the discrepancies about the rules of the method, especially regarding its validity in the field of induction.

There are universal propositions that can be based on axiomatic acceptance foundations or deduced from repeated and coincident experiences; a new proven proposition could move us in three ways: a) incorporate it into the first, thus verifying its validity and adding a new experience to it; b) eliminate the first one by doubting its total validity; partially invalidate it, limit its scope or leave it subject to future verification; c) eliminate the first one and replace it with the new proposition; in case there would be a falsification or an error, if with that substitution there we make the mistake or the falsification. In any case, the scientist must be very cautious when making his decision, since an absolute logical precision is never achieved and the control or verification process can never be terminated, the same before as after accepting, limiting or rejecting a proposition.

In short, it is not possible to draw a sharp separation between propositions that seem acceptable to us one and unacceptable the other with respect to the same question, or from one science to another, of course, a proposition cannot be verified by other arbitrary or insufficiently founded propositions, nor does disagreement with these imply its invalidity; every verification requires accepted propositions. Nor should a moving proposition be rejected on the grounds of opposing another proposition that is considered "objectively valid" without inquiring into the rules of procedure that lead to the concept of such validity.

Some scientists have tried to make "objectively valid" or "guaranteed" propositions little less than intangible, but such a quality does not redeem them from the need to be based on other propositions and we could demand what I would call their logical genealogy. All this has to be the subject of repeated clarifications, starting again in search of the logical foundations and going all the way of the methodology, from Cartesian doubt and even better if from Socratic ignorance, already forgotten about our "finding" of a new proposition, or our doubts regarding the previously accepted one; it is necessary to advance with clear thought and any assertion that is reached, must be subsequently subjected to analysis and, if possible, to comparisons with other propositions of the same science or its auxiliaries, and to repeated observations; a discussion the final dialectic will ratify or rectify, in whole or in part, our proposition. For Felix Kaufman, the **objectivity** it can be reduced to a question of terminology, depending on the approach; it is unquestionable perhaps in the natural sciences, with wide acceptance of basic rules of procedure; but things are different or seem quite different in the field of social sciences.

The social and cultural sciences give importance, next to accepted propositions in the scientific field, to the propositions called **protocols**, or are observations reported by particular people, often laymen in the field; many annotations and considerations are based on assertions of that kind, and this usually occurs in folklore research. The problem of determining the meaning and importance of **protocol proposals** in scientific research, it should not be confused with the epistemological question of the latest sources of knowledge, which has nothing to do with the logical analysis of the empirical procedure. The acceptance of such Propositions does not admit of complacency, that is to say that, in addition to great confidence in the observer and extreme care in understanding or interpreting his statement, other elements of judgment will always be indispensable to decide on its validity, and if this were to be answered it would have to be demonstrated that the resulting proposition is generally accepted.

It should also be concerned about the confusion or disparity, certain or apparent, between a logical deduction, **strictu sensu**, and the logic of the empirical procedure, or in what way they can be combined to make the foundation of a universal proposition ambiguous; and since folklore can take advantage of both elements -contributing or excluding - in search of truth, whether one thinks of an actual or potential truth, before assuming a relevant change in its corpus it is convenient to keep in mind the distinction between universal and singular propositions, since the former cannot base their acceptance on a **protocol proposal**; in addition, the incorporation of the latter into science is not justified by a protocol proposal, although this may serve for the operation of verifying them; in short, it is necessary to distinguish between a **protocol proposal** and the singular proposition that is based on that or uses it for its verification, although the correspondence between the empirical and the scientific is often alluded to: "the assertion of facts rests on observation and laws rest on facts."

If folklore is conceptualized as the infra-history of peoples, it can resort to the use of historical methods, even when there are also negative criteria on the existence of a science of history proper, from those who demand a rigorous system of laws, based on universal propositions, hierarchical among themselves, comprehending vast groups of phenomena and capable of predicting the way in which these are to be realized at any time and place. This criterion was maintained as long as the history was only descriptive and the historiographers devoted themselves almost exclusively to the examination and exposition of political facts, some being dazzled by the "heroic" facts until consecrating a war chronology.

However, already in the second half of the sixteenth century Jean Bodin did not give methodological guidelines, nor did he have in mind the meticulous and careful observation of the customs and customs of peoples who wanted to penetrate deeply into the traditional cause of public affairs, considering that such a fund of knowledge was indispensable to the documented analysis and the correct exposition of historical facts. It is true that Bodin did not give methodological guidelines, nor did he have in mind the integral study of the historical fact as arising from the complex of society, but this criterion was going to develop, until Stellini affirmed in the 15th century that human history and the history of civilization should be taken as synonymous.

Bennedetto Croce, an acute critic, while denying the scientific character of history, equated it to a high art, by conceiving a "historical intuition" similar and parallel to aesthetic intuition, giving preponderance to the individual factor in the selection, ordering and interpretation of facts, with remnants of Aristotelian thought, At the beginning of this century, Altamira already pointed out the tendency to recognize "the universality of many of the historical movements in their fundamental elements, without prejudice to the modality that they necessarily take in each country". (Rafael Altamira, **New Orientation of Historical Studies**).

In Durkheim we also find the idea of a cultural dynamic and the distinction between the functional content of an institution and the causes that have given rise to it, some institutions can even be considered as simple survivals, at the same time warns against the unitary schemes of society and its development in successive stages and of invariable parallelism, because historical development seems to him "a multitude of fragments that cannot be aligned in strict continuity, because they are specifically different from each other".

Radcliffe Brown, to whom adequate procedures for anthropological research are due, with the conviction that laws governing collective life can be discovered, does not trust much in the value of the historical method —except when it is possible to know by that means the origin of some social institution—, because its particularism is not susceptible of generalizations like those achieved by the natural sciences.

As for the technique, we believe that folklore research should not be carried out without the prior knowledge of the laws that govern the life of society in a general way, nor without first formulating, as Radcliffe Brown advocated, the problems that have to be studied in the field, in search of examples that verify these laws or confirm a general thesis or, on the contrary, can deny or question them, or modify them or, finally, give rise to propose others. It is also necessary to follow scientific standards in all research and procedures of proven effectiveness; in this regard, we believe that the **A guide to the classification of cultural data** translated by the National Indigenous Institute of Guatemala and published by the Pan American Union, 1954, although the researcher must always, in addition to his field training, possess notions of American, Asian, European and African ethnography, in order to be able to note and consider analogies or similarities that favor his further interpretation and, once, familiarize him with variants and relationships.

For Kaufmann, the researcher is exposed to distort the fact, when interpreted to reflect your own experience, as it impacts the equation staff and the environmental conditions in variable degree, even according to the type of experience that it is; it also warns that the experiences that we collect from the other, taking their reports as data, are subject to a similar limitation, out of the trust that we are worthy of the subject; advised by the same do not rely much on the answers that you give us the people about their own experiences and suggests a systematic observation guided by hypothesis, such as that biology and psychology supplied to assume the behavior of animals or children, or could be to assume the behavior of animals or children, or could relate to the two procedures, based on similar principles, As Boas and Durkheim made similar preventions, moving the second to "do not accept the explanations of the aborigines in another sense than that of later reflections, made to justify practices persistent", the idea that he had in mind Radcliffte-Brown to generalize their claims, in which it will not appear allusions specific to the experiences of their informants individual, and that is, to coincide with many other anthropologists and sociologist Durkheim, considered a given culture as a systematic unit, usually built-in, with spontaneous coordination of its constituent elements without prejudice to the fact that each of these may play a different role.

In Malinowsky we find, on the other hand, great objectivity to collect, select and analyze the experiences of his informants, also giving importance to the individual to appreciate the deviations from the norm and the struggles against custom, for which it was imperative to learn the language of the culture he observed and live within it without prejudice; thus he believed he could collect at the same time "the imponderables of real life and typical behavior"; for this, he always chose specific outstanding issues in communal life to evaluate them in themselves and for their relationships with the whole. Without having to accept his concept of a closed culture or its exaggerated functional division, we recognize that Malinowsky is a good example of a researcher and his procedures must be tested to record all the facts that run through the social tradition and compare them with each other, since tradition takes local forms and sometimes even family characteristics without losing its unity, although this is divided to us sometimes apparently by its very complexity.

Without detracting from the importance of individual work, especially when it comes to experts, whose observation is concentrated in a certain region and in the subject of their specialty, it is desirable that the research is practiced by means of teams of trained people, whose skills and vocations complement each other; in most cases, they must also have technical resources such as photographic and film cameras, tape recorders, etc., and always consult — better if previously the cartography of the region and the geographical, sociological, historical, demographic, linguistic and cultural data before disseminated, as well as the existing bibliography on the folkloric fact that they are going to investigate.

All that previous preparation, in order to get acquainted with the object of his study, should not be taken by the researcher as a **parti-pris** to interpret the folkloric fact, no less as an accepted truth **a priori** and that he only tries to check in the field, turning his main and objective investigation into the search for evidence; any prejudiced mental predisposition could influence the mood of his informants themselves.

It takes a certain skill or experience to choose the informant and to treat him conveniently, because the same will fail with a person who out of shyness, distrust or ill will pretends ignorance or hides the facts, that with another whose ease, incomprehension and helpful condescension invent the facts or exaggerate or disfigure them. The researcher should never suggest the answer, nor try to correct in whole or in part the saying of his interlocutor, unless he has already collected several versions that disagree with each other or contradict each other; but in any case he will write down the information impartially and objectively, recording the name and quality of his informant, place and date of the interview, whether it is a surviving fact or only remembered, and what is the radius of its acceptance and validity within the various social classes, because the folkloric fact is collective and the quantitative process revealed by the survey or by correlations drawn from statistics, even to foresee the disappearance of certain folkloric facts more or less quickly repudiated by the upper classes or that the less enlightened classes are forgetting, stop observing or already look with indifference that detracts from the prestige of tradition or the strength of custom.

As for the preparation of researchers, we could follow the plan of Pablo de Carvalho Neto, professor at the Center for Anthropological Studies in Paraguay, 1950-51, and at the Uruguayan-Brazilian Institute of Culture since 1953; he divides education into basic and higher; the basic course includes: a) Concept and Generalities of Folklore; b) Folklore research; c) Folklore species. The **concept** is formed by interpreting the general characteristics of the **folkloric fact**: its conditions, traditional, functional, surviving, anonymous, collective, spontaneous culture; then its limits are studied, as a separate science as part or independent branch of Cultural Anthropology, or as a science related to ethnography and ethnology. As **general information**: the property of the term **folklore**, others that have been proposed, the most well-known and worthy of discussion definitions and, finally, the importance of the study of folklore. **Folklore research** it must understand theory and practice on the technique - systematic of a scientific nature-, specifying that of each phase of the research: observation, collection, criticism, classification, interpretation and use; and as for the technique itself: the approach, contact with the fact and with the informant; classification and invoice of files, and teamwork, indicating the task of the director.

The study of the **folk species** it can be alternated with that of research, especially as a didactic resource, because it attracts the student more, although it requires on the part of the latter a certain maturity and a general culture, indispensable to grasp the variants within universal folklore; these species cannot be definitively classified, new divisions and subdivisions or distinct orders can be added.